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I..’ EDERALbudget deficits in the United States have
becomea major concern since they rose to nearly $200
billion in fiscal 1983. In the absence of new policy
efforts, the deficit is projected to continue at $200 to
$250 billion per year for the rest of this decade.
Deficits, according to most popular analyses, raise
aggregate demand for goods, services and cr’edit,
which boosts output, emplovment~prices and interest
rates and reduces pr’ivate investment.
This article examines the empirical and theoretical
basis of this mainstream view. It also presents an
alternative set of hypotheses, which indicates that
fiscal policy actions are largely and directly offset by
private spending changes, rendering the aggregate
demand and interest rate channels of influence in-
significant.
Conventional wisdom holds that recent and pro-
spective U.S. budget deficits have significantly raised
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‘Most introductory textbooks emphasize the boost to aggregate
demand, interest rates and prices arising from expansionary” tiscal
policy actions. See, tor example, the macroeconomics sections of
Dolan (1983), McConnell (1984), or Samuelson and Nordhaus
(1985). These texts also discuss some of the theoretical reserva-
lions about these channels of influence raised below. Note that the
hypothesized reduction in investment does not exceed the initial rise
in aggregate demand forgoodsand services that arises from deficit’
increasing fiscal actions.
interest rates and have promoted the crowding out of
investment, But this view is based on the conventional
deficit/aggregate-demand hypothesis that also holds
that an expanded deficit should increase both output
and the price level. The latter conclusions became
center stage in 1980—81 when the Reagan economic
pr’ogram was debated. ‘their empir’ical validity, which
r’emains largely unquestioned, was strongly r’ejected
after mid—1981 when, with the deficit expanding, in-
flation plummeted from double—digit levels and the
economy entered the longest and most severe reces-
sion since the 1930s.
Interest rate developments were also at odCs with
the conventional view. Chart I shows the total govern-
ment deficit as a percent of GNP and the AAA bond
yield since 1950. The surge to historically high interest
r’ates occurred well before the 1981—82 surge in the
deficit.21 he recent rise in the deficit occurs from the
third quarter of 1981 to the fourth quarter of 1982.
when the AAA bond yield declined from about 15
percent to 12 percent. Then, in 1983—84, the deficit
declined sharply relative to CNP, hut the AA\ bond
yield rose.
The principal difficulty in finding apositive r’elation—
ship between deficits and interest rates arises from the
fact that both the budget deficit and interest rates
move cyclicallyand in opposite directions. Flence, it is
not surprising, especially forshor’t—ter’m interest r’ates,
that empirical studies often turn up supposedly sig-
2Similarly, the appreciation of the dollar precedes the deficit surge.
The steady upward appreciation of the trade-weighted exchange
rate for the U.S. dollar began at the end of 1979 (wheninterest rates
soared) and was not noticeably affected by the 1981—82 deficit
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Aaa Bond Yield and Total Government Deficit as a Percent of GNP
nificant negative statistical r’elationships between in-
ter’est rates and deficits, When one uses deficits con-
structed on a high—employment basis — that is, with
systematic cyclical influences removed — there still is
no evidence ofa positive relationship between deficits
and either short— or long—tern) interest rates over the
period 1955—83.’
‘See Tatom (1984). Efforts to control forfuture inflation expectations
to capture real interest rate changes do not affect the observed
absence of a deficit effect on interest rates. Also, some analysts
conjecture that the debt’GNP ratio positively influences the interest
rate. Regressions of quarterly changes in the kM bond yield or
three-monthTreasury billrates on changes in the ratio of net federal
debt to GNP, controlling for changes in thecapacity utilization rate
and the inflation rate one quarter ahead, yield a negative but insig’
nificant relationship for the debt ratio over the period 11955 to 111/
1984.
The independence of interest rates from the deficit has been
observed by Evans (1985).Also see Fetdstein and Eckstein (1970),
Sargent (1973), and the recent Treasury study (1984). Plosser
(1982) details many of the theoretical and econometrtcdifficulties of
previous tests of the interest rate/deficit hypothesis.
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Chart 2 shows private domestic investment as a
share ofGNP. Investment has declined and risen cvcli-
callysince 1980, hut these svvtngs obscure the strength
of investment over the past four years. When the
capacity utilization rate is relatively low, the demand
for new capital can he met more easily by the re-
employment ofexisting capital instead of investment
in new facilities, Thus, the share of investment in GNP
and the capacity utilization r’ate tend to move in tan—
dem or to be positi~’e1vcorrelated. to 1984, the capac—
its’ utilization rate was well below its 1979 level, when
the prior peak investment ratio was acnieved. Never—
theless, the share of private domestic investment in
GNP in 1984 virtually matched this peak level.
Even plant and equipment nonresidential fixedj
investment has been quite high by historical stand—
ards. despite the recessions in 1980—82. When nominal
rnr515253545556575859606r6263b46566676a697o7r727314756zr7sl9rozrrIsai4r9rs
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nonresidential fixed investment and GNP are adjusted
by their respective deflators, in order to measure r’eal
investment as a share ofreal GNP, the recent strength
of plant and equipment spending relative to real GNP
represents a postwar peakperformance. This share is
shown in chart 3. Note that, even at the depths of the
previous two recessions, real plant and equipment
purchases were about as large a share of real GNP as
the 11 percent attained at the peaks of previous invest-
ment booms in 1966 and 1969. The conventional argu-
ment, that investment has been unusually weakdue to
the higher real rates ofinter’est, is not obviously impor-
tant in explaining recent investment experience.
‘The reason for the greater real strength is thai the relative price for
new plant and equipment declined sharply since 1980. Thenonresi-
dential fixed investment deflator declined 14.2 percent relative to the
GNP deflator from 1980 to 1984.
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A closer’ look at the theoretical mechanism underly-
ing conventional analyses ofthe deficit reveals some of
the potential shom’tcomings of these analyses. In the
textbook view of the effects of fiscal policy on the
economy, increased gover’nment deficits expand ag-
gregate demand, spending, output and employment,
regardless of whether larger deficits arise fi’om in-
creases in purchases, transfer payments or reductions
in taxes. So-called balanced-budget increases in trans-
fer payments, in which a rise in transfer payments is
matched by a rise in taxes, leave aggregate demand
unchanged ignoring distribution effectsi, while tax-
financed increases in government purchases raise ag-
gregate demand,
Such conventional analyses also take into account
crowding out — reductions in private spending that
Ch,, 2
Nonresidential Fixed Investment as a Percent of GNP
Percetir
14
950 Sr 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 or 69 70 Ir 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 Sr 82 82 841985
Let.,’ d&, ple,,.d,
2
,dq,e,t,’FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OFST. LOUIS ocroe~1085
C’,’,,’
Private Domestic Investment as a Percent of GNP
occur due to fiscal policy changes. Increases in the
deficit, so the argument goes, result in increased con)—
petition in credit markets, thus bidding up intet’est
t’ates. Also, if fiscal policy actions raise, aggregate de-
mand, the increased competition in the market for
goods and services bids up the general level of prices.
1”orboth reasons, real private spending is reduced, ot’
crowded out. Households reduce their current r’eal
consumption expenditures and increase saving; firms
reduce real investment spending in response to a
higher interest rate.
,.,,,‘~,,,,,,,, .,,,,.,,,,~f:~i,,,,, ~ 22) 4,.,
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‘l’he important link between fiscal polkw, aggregate
demand and interest rates and the concept of crowd-
ing out of private expenditures can be illustrated in
the market for saving. In figure 1. the demand for
saving is taken to he the demand fox’funds to finance
investment. Other things that influence investment
remaining the same, the deniand fot’investment or for
saving to finance it, is inversely related to the interest
rate. The supply ofsaving consists of private saving —
household disposable income less desired consump-
tion expenditures — and government saving — the
excess of tax receipts over government expenditures,
or the budget surplus. In figure 1, the national saving
schedule is drawn as upward-sloping, indicating that,
given income, households reduce consumption ex-
penditures and save more at higher’ interest rates. In
equilibrium at point A, the interest rate equates the
supply and demand for national saving at interest rate
1,,.
In the conventional analysis, fiscal policy actions
affect national saving, investment and the interest rate
by lii directly changing the bitdget surplus or govern-
ment saving, and/or’ 12) altering prvate saving. Such
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Figure I




and interest rates, a fall in taxes or a rise in transfer
payments tfinanced by borrotvingi adds to disposable
income, increasing both private consumption ex-
penditures and pnvate saving. Since par’t ofthe taxcut
ortransfer payment is spent for consumption, thense
in privatesaving is less than the deficitincrease. Thus,
national saving declines,
Such a decline also indicates that desired aggregate
demand for goods and services has risen so that it
must exceed the given level of GNP; the aggregate
demand increase equals the reduction in national
saving. With no change in GNP, the interest rate must
rise to equate national saving and investment. In re-
sponse to the higher inter’est rate, investment is
crowded out, or declines, hut some of the initial short-
fall in national saving is eliminated since individuals
also increase private saving.
A rse in government purchases also affects national
saving. In contrast to a tax cut or a rise in transfer
payments, a rise in government purchases does not
change disposable income, so consumption expendi-
tur-es and private saving remain unchanged. But the
rise in purchases raises the budget deficit or’ reduces
government saving. National savingfalls 1wexactly the
change in aggr-egatedemand fort’goods and services, as
was the case above fot’ the tax or’ transfer payment
Notional saving
change. In this case, however’, the rise in aggregate
demand is the government’s, wiule before it was the
policy-induced change in private consumption ex-
penditures. Asbefore, however, interest r’ateswill tend
to rse, increasing pr’ivate saving and reducing con-
sumption and investment expenditures.
Thx’financed changes in gover’nment purchases, on
the other’ hand, r’educe private saving, given the inter-
est tate and GM’. The higher tax reduces disposable
income arid therefore both consumption expendi-
tur’es and private saving. The reduction in private
saving is less than the tax increase, because private
expenditures on goods and services also decline,
Since the government deficit does not change with
such a fiscal action, the decline in national saving
equals the reduction in private saving. The reduction
in national or’ private saving again indicates a rise in
aggregate demand for goods and services. Tax-
financed changes in transfer payments have no effect
on aggregate demand for goods and services or the
national saving schedule in figure 1, since the govern-
Saving and ment deficit and disposable income remain un-
investment changed. Thus, private and total spending on goods
and services and private and national saving are
a~u unaffected.
In summary, theinitial effects offiscal policy actions
on private and national saving are the critical counter-
paris of any initial change in aggr’egate demand for’
goods and services;both indicate theextent ofupward
pressure on interest r’ates. The analysis here illustrates
the importance of both of these initial shifts. It also
indicates why crowding out tends to occur. In the
conventional analysis, however’, crowding out is gen-
er’allv pr’esumed not to be complete.’
The growth in aggregate demand associated with
r’eductions in national saving can raise or “crowd in”
GNP. When GNPrises, disposable income, consump-
tion expenditures and private saving rise; the initial
reduction of private and national saving is offset by
‘The Council of Economic Advisers (1985), pp. 70—77, suggests that
economic theory and evidence support “complete” crowding out,
where the total real demand for goods and services is unaffected by
fiscal policy actions, Whether this crowding out, primarily of invest-
ment, arises through interest-rate or price-level crowding out or
direct substitution of public for private expenditures is not indicated,
The Congressional Budget Office (1985) also provides a detailed
discussion of the effects of deficits, A recent review by Brunner
(1984) provides the best recent discussion of the theoretical issues
associated with the macroeconomictheory of fiscalpolicy. Also, see
Carlson and Spencer (1975).
Investment
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increases in both as GNP incr’eases. The full adjust-
ment of GNP, however, with inter’est r’ates constant,
cannot raise national saving back to its initial level, so
the inter-est rate incr’ease and crowding out will still
occur. Note, however-, that GNP cannot increase, just
as interest rates cannot rise, unless the initial reduc-
lions in national saving occur.
2lonw I1ese,ri.ation.~s:1~tiePE.4r(fVIfuCItt
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An alternative set of hypotheses about the effects of
fiscal policy actions on the economy, sometimes
called classical or Ricardian, emphasizes two theoreti-
cal considerations called the permanent income hy-
pothesis and dc ante crowding out. According to this
view, consumption expenditures are a function of
permanent income; consequently, variations in saving
land saving relative to GNPI have a large cyclical com-
ponent.’ The permanent income hypothesis also en-
tails agovernment budget constraint, which indicates
that the present value of current and future govern-
ment expenditures must equal the present value of
current and future taxes. This constraint implies that
the method of financing government expenditures is
in’elevant; that is, whether current expenditures are
financed through taxation or borrowing (future taxes
with an equivalent present value) has no influence on
the economy.7 Thus, changes in taxes are offset by
equal changes in private saving, and national saving is
unaffected.
The second consideration is that government ex-
penditures are, to some degree, substitutes for private
expenditures.’ For example, an increase in govern-
ment expenditures for school lunches may reduce
private consumption expenditures on such goods;
increased public expenditures for transportation ser-
‘Textbook analyses typically distinguish between permanent and
temporary changes in fiscal actions, based on the permanent in-
come hypothesis.Temporary changes in taxesor transfer payments
are generally regarded to have liftle effect on private spending or
national saving since such changes do not alter perceptions of
permanent income or wealth. A type of temporary, or at least
transitory, change in the budget arises from the “cyclical deficit.”
When unemployment rises due to a cyclical fall in income, tax
receipts decline and federal expenditures, especially transfer pay-
ments for unemployment insurance, rise. As a result, the budget
deficit rises.
7This consideration hascome to be called the Ricardian Equivalence
Theorem. It is developed by Barro (1974, 1979) and has received
strong support from Plosser (1982), Aschauer (1985), Tanner
(1979) and Korrnendi (1983). See also Kochin (1974).
‘Bailey (1971) discusses at length the theoretical possibilities that
fiscal actions directly influence private sector behavior.
vices may reduce private demand for such investment
goods; increased transfer payments provide assis-
tance that ma substitute forprivatesaving and invest-
ment. To the extent that such substitution occurs,
growth in government purchases crowds out private
purchases with no net effect on economic activity;
such growth in government purchases results in off-
setting reductions in private expenditures including
investment. Similarly, growth in transfer- payments
can affect the mix of desired private spending. No
excess demand for national saving occurs, nor is ag-
gregate demand for goods and services altered; thus,
GNPand interest r’ates are not affected by fiscal policy.
The emphasis in this view of fiscal policy is on cx
ante crowding out, in which fiscal policy actions are
largely offset by direct private sector responses.” An
increase in government purchases does not have to
affect the interest rate; either national saving could
remain unaffected by government purchases, as these
substitute forprivate consumption, or investment de-
mand could be reduced equally, as government pur-
chases substitute for investment purchases. Similarly,
national saving and private investment can be re-
duced due to increased transfer payments. Thus, ag-
gregate demand, interestrates and the price levelmay
not be affected by fiscal actions.”
Ifcx ante crowding out leads to private expenditure
changes that fully offset fiscal policy actions, then the
effects of fiscal actions on the private and national
saving will not be the same as in the conventional
analysis. One fundamental difference is that a rise in
taxes will reduce private saving by an equal amount.
Thus, a tax hike will result in an equal reduction in
private saving, leaving national saving unchanged.”
This implies that the effects of government expendi-
tureson national saving are the same whether they are
tax- or bond-financed.
Another major difference is that a rise in govern-
‘There are exceptions to the conclusion that fiscal actions do not
affect aggregate demand. See Hall (1980) and Barro (1981) for
discussions of the real output effects of temporary increases in
government purchases, especiallydefense expenditures, even in a
Ricardian world.
“Theabsence of effects of fiscal actions on GNP has been a feature
ofreduced-form estimates like the St. Louis equationfor some time.
See Hater (1982) and the references there for recent analyses.
Permanent adverse effectsof government expenditures on invest~
ment are found in Carlson (1982). Also see the references in
footnote I.
“In the conventional view, a rise in taxes initially reduces disposable
income by an equal amount and results in a fractional reduction in
private saving. The fraction, called the marginal propensityto save,
is generally regarded to be relatively small, on the order of 20 to 30
percent.
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Table 1
The Share of Government Budget
Components in GNP: 1980 and 1984
1980 1984 Change
Total government expenditures 33 0% 34 3% 1 3%
Purchases of goods ana services 20 4 20 4 00
Transfer payments 126 13 9 1 3
Total government receipts 31 8 31.0 0 8
Total government surplus 1 2 34 22
ment purchases will reduce private consumption or
raise saving, if such purchases are a substitute for
private consumption expenditures. Similarly, a rise in
transfer payments will reduce private saving and in-
vestment, ifsuch payments are substitutes for saving.
This can occur independently of distribution effects
that in either view can yield a reduction in private
saving. Finally, in the classical view, the effects of
government expenditures on national saving can be
associated with equal shifts in investment demand
that reflect the extent to which government expendi-
tures and investment are substitutes.”
flt~(’t~,tt .itiscai Pabaa .Devainpmn.ents ait•n.•i
Saving and .thi.~estnntnt
A comparison of the implications of the two views
above can be facilitated by a look at the experience in
the 1980s. Table I shows the principal components of
the totalgovernment surplus asa share ofGNPin 1980,
before the ballooning ofthe federal deficit, and 1984,
the latest yearavailable. From 1980 to 1984, the deficit
widened from 1.2 percent to 3.4 percent of GNP. The
share ofgovernment purchases was unchanged, while
the share of transfer’ payments rose. The rise in the
deficit wasaccounted forprimarilyby a rise in transfer
payments and, to a smaller extent, by a decline in
taxes.’3 These changes are explained to only a small
“Several recent studies have examined the effects of fiscal actions
on personal consumption expenditures in tests of ex ante crowding
out. See Aschauer (1985), Feldstein (1982) and Kormendi (1983).
These tests allow for direct substitution of government purchases
for private consumption expenditures and transfer payments for
private saving; they do not address the extent to which government
expenditures directly affect private investment expenditures.
“Thedecline in the share ofgovernment receipts in GNP matches the
decline in the share ofcorporate profit tax liability in GNP.
extent by relative differences in the cyclical perfor-
mance of the economy in 1980 and 1984. The average
unemployment rate of 7.5 percent of the civilian labor
forte in 1984 was only slightly higher’ than the 7.1
percent in 1980. When unemployment is higher, gov-
ernment transfer payments (especially unemploy-
ment compensationt are higher, and, due to cyclical
losses in income, tax payments are lower than they
would be otherwise.
In the conventional analysis, the effect of the
changes in the fiscal stance of the government sector
shown in table 1 on saving is to raise the private saving
rate (PSRI by a fraction — on the order of about 25
percent — of the increased deficit (2.2 percent) or
roughly 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points. Since the ex-
pected rise in the PSR is smaller than the rise in the
deficit, the national saving rate INSR) would be ex-
pected to fall by the difference, about 1.6 to 1.7 per-
centage points. Associated with this shift in the na-
tional saving rate is an increase in the share of GNP
allocated for consumption expenditures and an ex-
cess demand for funds to finance investment. In the
conventional view, aggregate demand should have
risen, improving the cyclical performance of the
economy and raising prices, and interest rates should
have risen; the latter, of course, should have lowered
investment.
In the classical view, part of the increased deficit
arose from the reduction in receipts as ashare of GNP;
this part is expected to be largely offset by a rise in the
PSR, leaving the national saving rate unchanged. The
remainder oftherise in the deficit, the rise in the share
of transfer payments, would be expected to reduce
private saving and investment to the extent that
households viewtransfer payments as substitutes for
such avenues of wealth accumulation. Thus, the PSR
and NSR could be expected to decline by some frac-
tion of the 1.3 percentage-point rise in transfer pay-
ments. As a net result of these two forces, the P58
should rise by up to 0.8 percentage points and the
NSR should decline slightly. tnter’est rates and the
cyclical components of real GNP and employment
should be unchanged.
Comparing 1984 with 1980, two central differences
in expectations emerge between the conventional and
classical views. These difterences concern interest
rates and the cyclical performance of the economy.
The cyclical performance of the economy was slightly
worse in 1984 than in 1980. Interest rates were gener’-
ally higher’ in 1984 than in 1980, despite a decline in
inflation. For- example, in 1980, the consumer price
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Table 3
The Federal Budgetas a Share of GNP
1990
1960 1981 1982 1983 1984 Current Services Administration
Sha’e n ONP of.
Fxperoitures 224°, 23 2”~ 2~3°c 253% 240% 23 F’: 209%
Receipts 204 2’ 206 95 ‘92 19a 195
Delict 20 20 37 s8 48 39 14
lJri’nea Budgeu E~umatesfror” Budge! of toe U,r,rcd Stales Govcwm’,orcnt 1985
than replacement cost in computing depreciation a!-
lowances. The sharp change iii this adjustment
r’efiects the slowdown in inflation fl’om 1980 to 1984,
reducing the extent of underdepreciation due to his-
toncal cost accounting; mor’e important, thechange in
the adjustment reflects the acceleration of depr’ecia-
tion allowed by the 1981 tax act.The latter’is indicated
by the large jump in the size of the cor’porate capital
consumption allowance (without capital consump-
tion adjustment relative to GNP. This jump accounts
for the reported rise in the share of undistributed
corporate profits with adjustment) despite the lackof
improvement in the cyclical performance of the
economy.
Thus, other things have notheeo equal in the deter-
mination of saving and investment. ‘I’ax cuts arising
from accelerated depreciation have added substan-
tially to the private saving rate and made possible the
cash flow to finance the deficit induced by such a loss
in government revenue, without interest rate changes.
But the new incentives also induced a substantial rise
in the share of investment in GNP, especially in the
share of plant acid equipment investment and a r’edi-
r’ection of investment by U.S. firms from abroad. Not
surprisingly then, yields on most pr’ivate assets rose
sharply from 1980 to 1984.
‘l’he changes in saving and investment r’ates from
1980 to 1984 conform more closely to the expectations
of the classical view than to those of the conventional
analysis, especially when the investment incentives of
the 1981 tax act are taken into account. In the absence
of more detailed statistical analysis, however, the data
do not yield decisive evidence supporting either’view
to the exclusion of the other. The str’ength of invest-
ment — arising from impr’oved incentives, despite
nearly unchanged cyclical perfor’mance of the econ-
omy and a shar’plv higher real rate of ioter’est — has
been associated with asubstantially smaller’decline in
the national saving rate and a much larger rise in the
private saving rate than that suggested by the conven-
tional view, however’.
/tie .inrpiktatorts nl’.Fetirbcrai DeiPtUs .i±or
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‘I’able 3 shows the growth in feder’alexpenditures as
a share of GNP from 1980 to 1984 and unified budget
estimates for 1990. The latter ar’e constructed assum-
ing either’ no further policychanges orthe implemen-
tation of administration proposals. In the absence of
policy changes, expenditures are highen’ in each year
than in 1980, resulting in an iniplicit crowding out of
Investment.” While expenditures acid deficits peak as
ashare ofGNP in 1983, the declines to 1990 are small.”
The ex ante cr’owding-out view suggests that tax
changes have no effect on national saving, but that
changes in government expenditures redirce invest-
ment to the extent that such expenditures iower’ na-
tional saving.’’ Increases in government expenditures
“The Congressional Budget Office (1985) discusses the effect ot
suchdeficits on the ratio of federal debt to GNP, including the view
that it is the level of the debt relative to GNP ratherthan the deficit
that affects interest rates. Their current services estimate ot this
ratio rises to near 50 percent ot GNP in 1990, roughly its level in
1959. Theviewthatthe comparable declinein this ratio from 1959 to
1974 reducedinterest rates is noticeablyabsent from contemporary
orearlierstudies. Also see footnote3 above.
“Thegrowth in thegovernment budgetdeficit from 1980 to 1982 was
cyclical in nature and would not have raised interest rates in any
case. Investment demand is typically more strongly cyclical than
budget deficits so that, even it the conventional view were correct,
interest rates would not have risen due to cyclical deficit increases.
Barro (1983) and Tatom (1984) detail the cyclical deficits since
1980.
“Since gross domestic investment equals national saving plus net
foreign saving, the fiscal effects on saving must be mirrored in
similar changes in investment, otherthings equal,
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have little eflèct on interest rates or GNP, in this view,
although they do change the mix ofGNP and, depend-
ing on how they ar’efinanced, alterthe mix of national
saving.”
In the absence of policy changes to reduce tire shan’e
of government expenditur’es in the nation’s output,
cr-owding out will remain a serious concern. The ad-
ministration has proposed cutting the shar’eof federal
expenditures in GNP by 1990. This pi-oposal focuses
on reductions in government purchases.” Such apol-
icy would boost capital formation and economic
growth by raising private and national saving n’ates.
According to the classical view, however, this may
have little effect on interest rates. This view indicates
that deficit reduction efforts that focus on raising taxes
will have no short-ter’m impact on econonuc perfor-
mance, but will instead simply reduce private saving
by acorresponding amount!’
Sl.JM.M.AW.(
Popular anah’ses of recent and prospective U.S. gov-
ernment deficits suggest that deficits have naised out-
put,prices and interest rates and crowded out private
investment. ‘rhe implication of this view is that future
budget cuts, in the short run, will n’etan’d the growth of
aggregate demand but will lower interest rates, lead-
ing to a strengthening of private investment and long-
n’un growth.
There are reasons to question the relevance and the
“The link between deficits and the price level depends on whether
increased deficits raise aggregate demand and on the extent to
which deficits are accommodated by monetary growth. Theclassi-
cal view indicates that increased deficits do not raise aggregate
demand and, hence, cannot be inflationary. The second issue,
however, whether deficits contribute to money stock growth and,
hence, inflation, is not examined here. This link between the deficit
andinflation is developed more fully in Hem (1981). SeeHamburger
and Zwick(1981) for an alternative view.
“A detailed analysis of the unified budget proposals indicates that
they focus on reductions in federal aid to state and local govern-
ments, agriculture and other purchases. These expenditures are
principally eitherpartoftotal governmentpurchases directly,orthey
financesuch purchasesatthe state and localgovernment level. See
Carlson (1985).
“The earlier discussion does not distinguish between the type of
taxes. Thus, the effects discussed are for average relationships.
One of the most important qualifications that this raises concerns
businesstaxchanges that change investment incentives, The 1981
improvements in tax incentives for investment certainly lowered
taxes and raised the deficit and may, at unchanged interest rates,
haveleft nationalsaving unchanged, asthe classicalview suggests.
But the increased investment demand playeda major role in boost-
ing interest rates and thereby affected economic performance.
Recent proposals to remove those incentives would reverse many
ofthese effects on economic performance, even it the overall taxes
and deficits are unchanged.
accuracy of the conventional view. It pr’ovides an in-
consistent new of recent economic developments
with inaccuracies ranging from the forecast ofboom-
ing output, employment and inflation for’ 1981 and
beyond, to the forecast of rising interest rates. tn
addition, the evidence hen’e shows that the expected
crowding out of investment has been offset by other’
factors, resulting in an investment boom since 1980.
‘the alternative hypotheses examined here indicate
that fiscal policy actions are largely and directly offset
by the private sector. Thus, tax changes are offset by
adjustments to private saving, with no direct effect on
national saving or investment. This classical view of
fiscal policy also emphasizes that increased govern-
mnent purchases ar-c directly offset by reduced private
expenditures (especially investment).
According to the classical view, policy actions to
reduce the deficit are not likely to affect interest rates
and may not affect theinvestment boomn. For example
ifdeficit reduction entails simply raising taxes, private
saving will fall by a like amount and no additional
investment will occur. Totheextent that deficit reduc-
tion focuses on expenditures, however, investment
will be strengthened, but without the inducement of
lower interest rates.
‘l’he evidence from the recent experience suggests
that the classical view is correct and indicates the
importance of business tax cuts in raising domestic
saving, investment and interest rates and reducing
U.S.investment abroad. ‘the evidence is not decisive as
to which view more generally and accurately depicts
the effects of fiscal policy on the economy, however’.
But both views indicate that domestic investment and
economnic growth are impeded by deficits arising fi’om
governmnent expenditure growth, amid that they are
ultimately improved by n’estn’aint in such gn-owth. Pro-
posals to deal with the deficit without n-aising taxes
focus largely on reducing government nondefense
purchases. ‘the successful implementation of these
plans would ultimately r’aiseprivate saving and invest-
ment, alter’ the composition of national output and
pn-omote economic growth.
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